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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE---CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF ONE
PARENT IS IMPUTED TO THE OTHER TO DIMINISH THE LATTER'S RECOVERY FOR THE DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD. Stull v. Ragsda/e, 273

Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264 (1981).
The appellants, Donald and Youvanna Stull, were parents of
the decedent, four year old Windy Stull. While Donald was away at
work, Youvanna put Windy down for a nap and later fell asleep
herself. Without awakening her mother, Windy left the house and
crossed the adjacent highway where she was struck and killed by a
truck driven by the appellee, James Ragsdale.
Youvanna Stull instituted a wrongful death and survival' action against Ragsdale. On interrogatories, the jury apportioned 25%
of the negligence to Ragsdale and 75% to Youvanna Stull, awarded
each parent damages for mental anguish,2 and awarded funeral ex-

penses to the estate. The trial court entered judgment only for the
funeral expenses in favor of the estate, determining that Youvanna
Stull was barred from recovery by her own negligence 3 and that her
negligence should be imputed to Donald Stull, barring his recovery
as well. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the imputation of the

mother's negligence to the father, but allowed him to recover the
original jury award reduced by the percentage of negligence attributed to4 his wife. Stull v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 278, 620 S.W.2d 264
(198 1).
Because the present system of liability based on fault is
grounded in a philosophy of individualism, an individual is gener1. The Arkansas wrongful death and survival statutes are codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§ 27-901 to -906 (1979).
2. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), interpreted the

Arkansas wrongful death statute to provide that any recovery by the administratrix for the
wrongful death of the deceased would be for the benefit of the deceased's next of kin. Peugh
v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961), further interpreted the statute to allow recov-

ery for mental anguish.
3.

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 27-1765

(1979) provides in pertinent part: "If the fault charge-

able to a party claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable to
the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is not entitled to recover such damages."
4. The holding in Stull raises two issues. The first concerns the use of the doctrine of

imputed contributory negligence to bar the recovery of an innocent parent for the wrongful
death of a child because of the other parent's negligent supervision of the child. The second
relates to the proper application of the Arkansas comparative fault statute, set out supra note
3.
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However,

there are many situations in which the negligence of one party is
imputed to a totally innocent individual merely because of some relation between them.6 Such imputed conduct may be used in two
distinct contexts. First, it may be used to make an innocent party
vicariously liable for the blameworthy conduct of another based on
the existence of an agency relationship between the two.7 Thus, a
master may be held liable for the negligent acts of his servant 8 or an
innocent individual may be responsible for the negligence of another with whom he is engaged in a joint enterprise.9 Various reasons have been given for imposing vicarious liability in such
situations, including (1) that the innocent party has an actual or potential right to control the conduct of the negligent party, (2) that it
is necessary to allow an injured plaintiff to reach a financially responsible defendant, and (3) that it constitutes a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of risk. 10 In contrast to this use of the fiction of
imputed conduct to facilitate the plaintiff's recovery, it may also be
used to defeat an innocent plaintiffs claim against a negligent defendant because of the concurring negligence of a third party who
stands in some relation to the plaintiff."
During the early stages of its development, the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence was commonly applied to a variety of
5. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 23.1 (1956).
6. Id at § 26.1.
7. "Agency is a familiar and conspicuous branch of the law where the liability of the
principal for the acts of his agent may be and often is expressed in terms of the fiction of
imputed conduct." Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, I Wis. L. REV. 193, 194 (1921).

8. "Under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior, an employer will be liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is within the scope of his employment." Lundberg v. State, 25 N.Y.2d 467, 470, 306 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950, 255 N.E.2d 177, 179
(1969) (citing Sauter v. New York Tribune, Inc., 305 N.Y. 442, 113 N.E.2d 790 (1953)). The
Arkansas court has long recognized the doctrine. E.g., Gray v. McLaughlin, 207 Ark. 191,
179 S.W.2d 686 (1944); Hunter v. First State Bank, 181 Ark. 907, 28 S.W.2d 712 (1930);
Robinson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 111 Ark. 208, 163 S.W. 500 (1914); Ward v. Young, 42
Ark. 542 (1884).
9. The imputation of negligence between members of a joint enterprise is based on
principles of partnership and agency. Although it is most often used to bar a plaintiffs
recovery by imputing contributory negligence, it is also available to impute vicarious liability to one member of a joint enterprise for the negligent acts of another member. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, at § 26.13; Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367
S.W.2d 427 (1963).
10. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, at §§ 26.1-26.5; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE
L.J. 105 (1916).
11. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. It is with the use of the fiction in this
second context, often called imputed contributory negligence, that Stull is concerned.

1982]

NOTES

relationships outside the traditional agency and employment categories which define the limits of vicarious liability. 12 In these cases the
courts often imposed a fictitious agency relationship as an expedient
means to bar recovery. 13 The origin of the doctrine is generally
traced to the 1849 English case of Thorogood v. Bryan,' 4 in which
the court held that an injured omnibus passenger had so identified
himself with the driver by selecting that mode of conveyance that
his recovery against a negligent third party would be defeated by the
concurring negligence of his driver. 15 Among the reasons given for
the decision was that the plaintiff exercised a degree of control over
the driver.'6 Although Thorogood was overruled in England thirtynine years later, 7 it was adopted by several American jurisdictions
during the interim.' 8 However, its rule that contributory negligence
may be imputed based solely on the driver-passenger relationship
has since been rejected everywhere, 9 largely because it is recognized that passengers generally have no actual or potential control
in those cases and because it is "against all legal rules" to impute
contributory negligence on the basis of a relation which would not
support the imposition of vicarious liability. 20 The Arkansas
Supreme Court never recognized Thorogood2 ' and in Railway Co. v.
Harrel22 expressly rejected the imputation of contributory negligence in a factual situation similar to that in Thorogood.23
Similarly, contributory negligence has been imputed to third
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. Eg., Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng.
Rep. 452 (1849) (driver's negligence imputed to passenger to bar the latter's recovery); Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1829) (father's negligence imputed to minor child); Texas
& Pac. R. Co. v. Tankersley, 63 Tex. 57 (1885) (bailee's negligence imputed to bailor).
13. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 195.
14. 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849).
15. Id at 132, 137 Eng. Rep. at 458.
16. Id
17. Mills v. Armstrong, The Bernia, 13 App. Cas. 1 (1888).
18. The doctrine of imputed contributory negligence based on the theory of identification was first adopted in the United States in Brown v. New York, Central R.R., 31 Barb.
385 (N.Y. 1860), and was followed by only a minority of jurisdictions at any time. Lessler,
The ProposedDiscardof the DoctrineofImputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FOROHAM L.
REV. 156, 159 (1951).
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74.
20. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1886).
21. Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1, 10
(1946).
22. 58 Ark. 454, 25 S.W. 117 (1894).
23. Other Arkansas cases have refused to apply the Thorogood rule in passenger-carrier
situations. E.g., Hass v. Kessell, 245 Ark. 361, 432 S.W.2d 842 (1968); Crossett Lumber Co.
v. Cater, 201 Ark. 432, 144 S.W.2d 1074 (1940); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Henderson, 194 Ark.
884, 110 S.W.2d 516 (1937); Itzkowitz v. P.H. Ruebel & Co., 158 Ark. 454, 250 S.W. 535
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parties based on other special relationships. At one time, courts
generally imputed the contributory negligence of a bailee to his
bailor to bar the latter's recovery for damage to the bailed property
caused partly by a third party's negligence. 24 Although the Arkansas court once followed this rule, 25 it has since joined the overwhelming majority 26 of jurisdictions in refusing to impute negligence solely on this basis.27 Courts have generally analogized the
relationship arising out of a bailment situation to one arising out of
a passenger-carrier situation and have refused to impute contributory negligence for the same reasons.28
The existence of certain domestic relationships such as parent
and child and husband and wife has also served as a basis for im29
puting contributory negligence to members of these relationships.
30
For instance, in Harfeldv. Roper a New York court barred a minor child's recovery for injuries he sustained when struck by the defendant's sleigh because of his father's negligent supervision. The
court determined that there was an agency relationship whereby the
father was the child's "keeper and agent" for purposes of providing
supervision.3 The court also noted that the father would benefit
from the action and would "profit from his own wrong if recovery
were allowed." 32 Although the rule in Harofeld was widely accepted at one time, 33 it is now almost universally rejected. 34 Arkansas has allowed recovery when the award was for the benefit of
(1923); Pine Bluff Co. v. Whitlaw, 147 Ark. 152, 227 S.W. 13 (1921); Hot Springs St. R.R. v.
Hildreth, 72 Ark. 572, 82 S.W. 245 (1904).
24. Eg., Welty v. Indianapolis & V.R. Co., 105 Ind. 55, 4 N.E. 410 (1886); Illinois Cent.
R. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527 (1899); Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. 230 (1877).
25. Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 (1854).
26. Texas was apparently the last state to discard the rule, following it until its rejection
in Rollins Leasing Corp. v. Barkley, 531 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1976).
27. E.g., Bill C. Harris Constr. Co. v. Powers, 262 Ark. 96, 554 S.W.2d 332 (1977);
Featherston v. Jackson, 183 Ark. 373, 36 S.W.2d 405 (1931); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Boyce,
168 Ark. 440, 270 S.W. 519 (1925). The majority view is expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 489 (1965).
28. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, at § 23.6.
29. Leading cases involving imputation based on the parent-child relationship include
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1829), and Waite v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 120 Eng.
Rep. 679 (1858). A case involving imputation based on the marital relationship is Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 55 N.J.L. 577, 28 A. 3 (1893).
30. 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1829).
31. Id at 619.
32. Id at 620.
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. E.g., Gallagher v. Johnson, 237 Mass. 455, 130
N.E. 174 (1921).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. The modern rule is expressed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 488(1) (1965): "A child who suffers physical harm is not barred
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the child or his estate,35 even in situations in which the negligent
parent was the sole heir of the child's estate and would be the ultimate beneficiary.36
The imputation of contributory negligence based on the marital
relationship alone was generally predicated on the fact that at common law the wife shared her husband's legal identity, 37 but some
courts also based the rule on the premise that the marital relationship itself created an agency between spouses. 38 However, the passage of the Married Women's Acts 39 in all states has eliminated the
common-law identity concept, and, presently, only a few community property states impute contributory negligence on this basis
alone. 40 Arkansas is apparently in accord with the majority and will
not impute negligence between spouses unless other factors are
present. 4 '

The practice of creating these fictitious agencies to impute contributory negligence outside agency and employment situations was
widely criticized because the results were often harsh. 42 The majorfrom recovery by the negligence of his parent, either in the parent's custody of the child or
otherwise."
35. Eg., Willingham v. Southern Rendering Co., 239 Ark. 858, 394 S.W.2d 726 (1965);
Southern Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Jones, 238 Ark. 133, 379 S.W.2d 10 (1964); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Moore, 209 Ark. 1037, 193 S.W.2d 657 (1946); Railway Co. v. Rexroad, 59 Ark. 180,
26 S.W. 1037 (1894).
36. Eg., Stockton v. Baker, 213 Ark. 918, 213 S.W.2d 896 (1948); Nashville Lumber Co.
v. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 S.W. 301 (1911).
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74.
38. Lessler, supra note 18, at 167.
39. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (1971). A collection of these statutes may be found
at 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 167, 179-180 (1935).
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 487

(1965) takes the position that the negligence of one spouse does not bar recovery by the other
for his or her own physical harm. A few states have statutes providing that any recovery for
personal injuries by either spouse will be considered community property. In order to prevent the negligent spouse from benefitting from his own wrong, these states bar the injured
spouse's recovery. DeLozier v. Smith, 22 Ariz. App. 136, 524 P.2d 970 (1974); Clark v.
Foster, 87 Id. 134, 391 P.2d 853 (1964); Ostheller v. Spokane & I.E.R. Co., 107 Wash. 678,
182 P. 630 (1919).
41. E.g., Willingham v. Southern Rendering Co., 239 Ark. 858, 394 S.W.2d 726 (1965);
Ford v. Markham, 235 Ark. 1025, 363 S.W.2d 926 (1963); Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854,
350 S.W.2d 169 (1961); Holmes v. Lee, 208 Ark. 114, 184 S.W.2d 957 (1945). But see Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 248 S.W. 278, 280 (1923), in which
the court held that the wife's negligence in driving a car was imputable to the husband.
However, the court may have hinted at the existence of a joint enterprise by weighing heavily the fact that the husband had "control" over the vehicle's operation.
42. See Gilmore, supra note 7, at 193; Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Confributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932); Keeton, Imputed ContributoryNegligence, 13 TEX.
L. REV. 161 (1935); Lessler, supra note 18, at 156.
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ity rule today is that the contributory negligence of a third party will
not be imputed to bar an innocent plaintiffs recovery except in situations in which the plaintiff could be held vicariously liable for the
third party's conduct.43 Accordingly, Arkansas cases have imputed
contributory negligence when there is a master-servant relationship" or a joint enterprise.45
Aside from its general application, the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence has frequently been a factor in determining
whether recovery will be allowed in wrongful death cases in which
one or more of the beneficiaries have been contributorily negligent. 6 At common law no recovery was allowed for the death of a
human killed by the negligence or wrongful act of another.4
In
addition, death terminated the decedent's cause of action for personal torts. 8 In order to remedy the inequities created by these
common-law rules, every American state has enacted a statutory
remedy for wrongful death. 49 The two prevalent types of statutes
enacted for this purpose are wrongful death acts and survival acts. °
43. E.g., Hurley v. Peebles, 238 Ark. 739, 384 S.W.2d 261 (1964); Smalich v. Westfall,
440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 485 (1965)
rejects the application of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence in the absence of
the master-servant relationship (§ 486), a joint enterprise (§ 491), or in an action for wrongful death or loss of services when the negligence of the person who was injured bars recovery
by the person who has been deprived by the relation (§ 494). This rule has been appropriately named the "both ways test." Gregory, supra note 42, at 831.
44. E.g., Schubach v. Traicoff, 214 Ark. 375, 216 S.W.2d 395 (1949); Watts v. Safeway
Cab & Storage Co., 193 Ark. 413, 100 S.W.2d 965 (1937); Pine Bluff Water & Light Co. v.
Schneider, 62 Ark. 109, 34 S.W. 547 (1896).
45. E.g., Hurley v. Peebles, 238 Ark. 739, 384 S.W.2d 261 (1964); Wilson v. HoTloway,
212 Ark. 878, 208 S.W.2d 178 (1948) (overruled on other grounds in Riley v. Johnson, 239
Ark. 37, 386 S.W.2d 942 (1965)).
46. A related situation develops when the decedent was himself contributorily negligent. Generally, a claim arising in such cases will be barred or diminished regardless of
whether it was brought under a wrongful death act or a survival act. This rule is based
entirely on the courts' interpretation of the applicable statute, and imputed contributory
negligence is not a factor. Imputed contributory negligence may be used, however, to bar
recovery in cases in which the decedent is personally innocent but a party with whom he
stands in some recognized relationship is contributorily negligent. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 13.1, 13.3 (1974); 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
§ 5.9 (2d ed. 1975); H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 9.3 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 494 (1965).
47. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 126; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 1.2. This rule
apparently evolved from dicta in Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Baker v. Bolton, I Camp.
493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
48. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 126.
49. Id All state and federal wrongful death and survival statutes, as well as the original
Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, are compiled at 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 46,
at App. A (2d ed. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
50. An initial distinction must be made between actions based on wrongful death stat-
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Arkansas has both a wrongful death and a supplemental survival
act.'
When an action is brought under a survival statute, recovery is
generally deemed to be for the benefit of the estate, and any ultimate benefit to the beneficiaries is viewed as incidental.5 2 Therefore, under survival acts the negligence of an ultimate beneficiary or
heir of the estate will generally not bar recovery by the estate. 3 A
long line of Arkansas cases is in accord with this rule. 4
In contrast, when an action is brought under a wrongful death
act, recovery is sought directly for a designated group of beneficiaries rather than for the decedent's estate." Since the beneficiaries

themselves are given the right of action, if either the sole beneficiary
or all of the beneficiaries were guilty of negligence contributing to
the decedent's death, recovery will generally be barred or diminished. 6 However, in cases in which only one of several beneficiaries
is negligent, a majority of courts have held that recovery by the innocent beneficiaries is not barred.5 ' Thus, if the contributory negliutes, on one hand, and actions brought under survival statutes, on the other. In situations
involving wrongful death it is generally recognized that two distinct interests are invaded.
One is the interest of the family and dependents in the continued existence of the deceased.
Wrongful death acts redress this injury. Most of these acts are patterned after the original
Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, and are construed as creating a new right of
action on behalf of designated beneficiaries to compensate them for injuries resulting from
the loss of the decedent. Survival statutes, when enacted, protect a second interest, by preserving any right of action in the estate which accrued to the decedent before his death. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, at § 23.8.
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-901 to -906 (1979).
52. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.6; H. WOODS, supra note 46, at § 9.4.
53. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.6. E.g., Wilmot v. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61
A. 1069 (1905); Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 A. 821 (1924); Potter v. Potter, 224
Wis. 251, 272 N.W. 34 (1937). A discussion of this issue may be found at Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d
785 (1948).
54. Eg., Stockton v. Baker, 213 Ark. 918, 213 S.W.2d 896 (1948); Ashcraft v. Jerome
Hardwood Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 135, 292 S.W. 386 (1927); Nashville Lumber Co. v. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 S.W. 301 (1911); Miles v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 90 Ark. 485, 119
S.W. 837 (1909).
55. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.7. Eg., Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp.
648 (W.D. Ark.), appeal dismissed,285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1960); Davis v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.
Ry., 53 Ark. 117, 13 S.W. 801 (1890).
56. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.7; H. WOODS, supra note 46, at § 9.5. E.g., Peoples v. Seamon, 249 Ala. 284, 31 So. 2d 88 (1947); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Cochran, 77
Ark. 398, 91 S.W. 747 (1906); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1, 56 S.W. 46
(1900); Nichols v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 109 N.W.2d 131
(1961).
57. "The general rule in such cases is that, although the action or right of action will not
be barred, the amount of recovery will be reduced . . . to the extent of the contributorily
negligent beneficiary's share in the recovery." I S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.8. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 493(1) (1965) adopts this position. E.g., Hines v. Mc-
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gence of one beneficiary is to be imputed to innocent beneficiaries,
the imputation must be made on the basis of some relationship between the beneficiaries which would have given rise to it under general tort principles.58
In cases in which a child is killed or injured as a result of the
concurrent negligence of one parent and -a third party, courts are
divided on the issue whether the fault of the negligent parent will be
imputed to the innocent parent. 59 The majority rule is that the innocent parent is not to be barred from recovery on the ground of imputed contributory negligence.6 ° In reaching this result, courts have
reasoned that the mere existence of the marital relationship is not a
sufficient basis for making the imputation 6' and that the independence granted wives under the Married Women's Acts precludes the
contention that the wife was the husband's agent for the purpose of
caring for minor children.62
However, some courts have reached different results. In a few
community property jurisdictions where both spouses are entitled to
a share of any recovery made by either, courts have barred the innocent parent's recovery to prevent accrual of any benefits to the negligent spouse. 63 In addition, a minority of non-community property
jurisdictions refuse to allow the innocent spouse to recover. 64 In
Cullers, 121 Miss. 666, 83 So. 734 (1920); Anderson v. Memphis Street Ry., 143 Tenn. 216,
227 S.W. 39 (1921). A discussion of this issue may be found at Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785
(1948).
58. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.9.

59. Examples of cases holding that contributory negligence will not be imputed in such
circumstances include Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,412 U.S. 938 (1973); Ward v. Baskin, 94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957); Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M.
468, 379 P.2d 765 (1963); MacDonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 78 P. 753 (1904); and Tufty v.
Sioux Transit Co., 70 S.D. 352, 17 N.W.2d 700 (1945).
Cases in which recovery by the innocent parent has been barred include Crane v.
Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1944); Wheat's Adm'r v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W.2d
400 (1949); Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 A. 269 (1915); and Nichols v.
Nashville Hous. Auth., 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949).
60. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 46, at § 5.9. This is the position taken in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 494A (1965), which states that "[t]he negligence of one parent does
not bar recovery by the other parent for loss of the services of their child, or for medical
expenses incurred in caring for him."
61. Eg., Ward v. Baskin, 94 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 1957) (recovery was allowed for injury to a minor child).
62. Eg., Ulingworth v. Madden, 135 Me. 159, 192 A. 273 (1937); Herrell v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929).
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 74. Eg., Dull v. Atchison, T & S.F. Ry., 27 Cal.
App. 473, 81 P.2d 158 (1938).
64. E.g., Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 A. 269 (1915); Nichols v.
Nashville Hous. Auth., 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949).

NOTES

19821

297

these cases the courts generally have based their decisions on two
factors. First, these courts have reasoned that any award to the innocent parent will, in reality, be for the mutual benefit of both parents, thereby allowing the negligent parent to profit from his own
wrong.6 5 In addition, these courts have based the imputation of

negligence on holdings that an implied agency existed between the
parents in the care and supervision of minor children.66 Other
courts have apparently merely assumed that such an agency existed
and barred recovery by either parent without further discussion of
the rationale behind the imputation.6 7 An 1880 decision, St. Louis
IM

& S Ry. v. Freeman,68 indicates that the Arkansas court may

be included in this latter group.
Apart from the issue concerning the imputation of contributory
negligence, the holding in Stull v. Ragsdale6 9 presents questions re-

garding the proper application of the Arkansas comparative fault
statute. 70 At common law any negligence on the part of a plaintiff
which contributed to the injury entirely barred any recovery from a
negligent defendant.7 ' Despite subsequent limitations, 72 the use of
contributory negligence as an absolute defense proved to be unduly
harsh and led to much dissatisfaction.73 In order to alleviate this
harshness, many jurisdictions adopted the concept of comparative
negligence, whereby the damages are divided between a defendant
65. Eg., Wheat's Adm'r v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W.2d 400 (1949).
66. E.g., Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 A. 269 (1915).
67. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 272. Eg., Vinette v. Northern Pac. Ry., 47 Wash. 320, 91
P. 975 (1907).
68. 36 Ark. 41 (1880). In Freeman the Arkansas Supreme Court considered a case
which was factually similar to Stull. A minor child was left in her mother's care while her
father was away at work. The child was struck and killed by a train after the mother negligently left her unattended. The court in Freeman, without expressly imputing the mother's
negligence to the father, barred the father's suit for the child's wrongful death.
69. 273 Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264 (1981).
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979), set out supra note 3.

71. The doctrine of contributory negligence originated in dicta contained in Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809), and was
given "full and broad application" by courts subsequently applying the doctrine. V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at § 1.2.
72. Many courts placed significant limitations on the use of the defense. The doctrine
of last clear chance prevents the use of contributory negligence as a defense when the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Eg., Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W.
546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). Also, the defense was generally not available in cases of
intentional torts. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 5, at § 22.5. Additionally, if the
defendant's conduct was regarded as reckless or was in violation of a statute intended to
protect the plaintiff, the plaintiffs contributory negligence would not bar his recovery. V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at § 1.2.

73. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at § 3.1.
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and a contributorily negligent plaintiff.74 Several types of comparative negligence systems exist in the United States today.75 Under
pure comparative negligence systems, the damages awarded to a
contributorily negligent plaintiff are simply reduced by the proportionate share of the negligence attributed to him. 6 Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to some recovery unless his negligence is found to be
the sole cause of his injury.7 7 Other states have adopted modified
systems, under which the plaintiff is entirely barred from recovery
when his negligence is equal to or greater than that of the defendant.78 A third system of comparative negligence, the slight-gross
system, requires that the quality of each party's negligence be examined and allows a reduced recovery when the plaintiffs negligence was only "slight" when compared to that of the defendant.79
In 1955, the Arkansas legislature enacted a pure comparative
negligence statute.80 However, the pure system was criticized by
both insurance companies and the "plaintiffs bar," who contended
74.
75.
76.
ANN. §

Id
Id

Id at § 3.2. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE
11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 920-4 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1981).
In addition, several states have judicially adopted pure comparative negligence. See
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v.
Ribar, 85 I11.2d 1, 521 Ill. App. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585,
256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
77. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at § 3.2.
78. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT., § 13-21-111 (Supp.
1981); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1981); UiAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977). In addition, West Virginia judicially adopted this system in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va.
1979). For a discussion of the evolution of comparative negligence in Georgia, see V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at § 1.4.
Other states have adopted a slightly different form of the modified system and will
allow recovery by an equally negligent plaintiff. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1974); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1981);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1981).
79. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979).
80. 1955 Ark. Acts 191 stated in part that "the contributory negligence of the person
injured. . . shall not bar a recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the injured person."
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that it was too confusing to juries."' Thus, two years later the legislature adopted a modified form of comparative negligence under
which the defendant's negligence had to be greater than the plaintiffs before any recovery was allowed. 2 This modified system was
incorporated into the present Arkansas Comparative Fault Act,
which was enacted in 1973 and amended in 1975.83
The Arkansas court in Stull v. Ragsdale4 imputed the mother's
negligence to the father on the basis of two major considerations.
First, the court determined that there is a "community of interest"
between the husband and wife concerning the care of their minor
children. 5 In addition, the court recognized that if the innocent
husband were allowed to recover, the negligent mother would in reality receive some benefit from the recovery, thus allowing her to
profit from her own wrong.8 6 Holding that the purpose of the Arkansas comparative negligence statute is to "distribute the total
damages among those who caused them," ' the court refused to
deny the father's recovery altogether but, rather, reduced his damages by the proportionate share of the mother's negligence.8 8 In his
dissent, Justice Purtle pointed out that Arkansas cases had refused
to impute contributory negligence in similar situations and argued
that the majority had deviated from this "progressive and enlightened path. 8 9 In addition, Justice Purtle contended that the husband should either recover his entire award or nothing at all, since if
the wife's negligence were imputed to him he would be 75%
negligent. 90
The court's decision in Stull involves the application of two distinct legal principles-the doctrines of imputed contributory negligence and comparative fault. Neither application in this case can be
defended on logical grounds, although practical reasons for reaching the result may exist.
81.

H. WOODS, supra note 46, at § 4.2.

82. 1957 Ark. Acts 296 provided that "contributory negligence shall not prevent a recovery where any negligence of the person so injured. . . is of less degree than any negligence of the person. . . causing such damage .... "
83. The present act is compiled at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979).
84.
85.
86.
87.

273 Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264 (1981).
Id at 280, 620 S.W.2d at 267.
Id at 281, 620 S.W.2d at 267.
Id

88. Id
89. Id at 286, 620 S.W.2d at 270 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
90. Id at 289, 620 S.W.2d at 271. Although Justice Purtle did not specifically refer to
the Arkansas comparative negligence statute, his objection was apparently based on the
premise that the statute forbids recovery by a plaintiff who is 50% or more negligent.
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Prior to Stull, Arkansas courts had not expressly used the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence to bar an innocent plaintiffs recovery when no actual agency relationship existed. 91 Given
the equality of husband and wife before the law in Arkansas, 92 it
would appear that each should have a common and equal duty to
exercise care in supervising minor children. Therefore, absent an
express agreement between them that one should act as the other's
imposed for
agent for such purposes, no fictitious agency should
93 be
the purpose of imputing contributory negligence.
In addition, in Arkansas each spouse is entitled to sue94 and to
95
own and control personal property independently from the other.
This would seem to reduce the weight of the court's argument that
the recovery would be for the mutual benefit of both spouses. However, as a practical matter, the court was probably correct in its contention, since in reality one spouse would probably have access to
any recovery made by the other.
Stull undoubtedly represents a clear deviation from the wellestablished trend in Arkansas law concerning the application of imputed contributory negligence outside established agency relationships. However, in light of the court's long-standing previous
refusal to impute contributory negligence on the basis of fictitious
agencies, it is doubtful that the decision was intended to signal a
future policy of disregard for the widely recognized both ways test.96
Of perhaps greater concern is the court's rather unique application of the Arkansas comparative fault statute. 97 The statute, both
on its face and as judicially interpreted, allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover apportioned damages only when his fault
is less than that of the defendant. 98 As the dissent in Stull pointed
out, the imputation of the mother's negligence to the father made
the father 75% negligent. 99 Therefore, he should have been unable
to recover under the Arkansas modified comparative fault system.
91. See Leflar, supra note 21, at 10-15.
92. See Married Women's Emancipation Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (1971).
93. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 272-73.
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (1971).
95. Id §§ 55-402, 55-404 (Supp. 1981).
96. See supra note 43.
97. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979).
98. The statute states in part that damages will be diminished in proportion to fault "[if
the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of less degree than the fault chargeable
to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages." Id Eg.,
Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.W.2d 34 (1972).
99. 273 Ark. at 289, 620 S.W.2d at 270 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
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The court, however, allowed him to recover the jury award reduced
by the 75% negligence attributed to him."°° In effect, the court
treated the issue as if it were applying a pure comparative negligence standard, which allows apportioned recovery whenever the
plaintiff's negligence is not the sole proximate cause of his injury.
The question thus presented by the holding in Stull is whether the
court, either through inadvertence or by design, has judicially
adopted a pure comparative negligence system.' 0
Reid Harrod

100. Id at 281, 620 S.W.2d at 267.
101. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated in Stull: "Therefore, in a wrongful death action
in which oneparent isfoundnegligent,as here, we believe the better result would be to permit
recovery of damages by reducing the award of damages to the non-negligent parent by that
amount of negligence attributed to the other parent." Id This specificity would seem to
indicate that the court intended to restrict the application of pure comparative negligence to
the particular facts of Stull. However, in reaching its decision the majority relied on what it
apparently considered to be the purpose of the comparative negligence statute, i.e., to "distribute the total damages among those who caused them." Id Whether this suggests judicial dissatisfaction with the legislatively enacted modified comparative fault system which
allows such a distribution only up to a point remains to be determined.

